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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN F. RUSSELL, 
Plm:'ntiff ,and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRANT L. VALENTINE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FRO~£ THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY. HONORABLE 
CHARLES G. COWLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
SAMUEL C. POWELL, and 
D. JAY WILSON 
David Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
HANSON AND BALDWIN AND 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act by the Lessor, plaintiff, against the defendant, as an 
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Assignee of a lease to interpret the terms of the lease and 
to determine if the lease is terminated. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber 
County, Utah, before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, 
sitting without a jury. Judgment was rendered in favor 
of the plaintiff. 
ST'ATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Edwin F. Russell is now, and was in 
the year 1950, the owner of a tract of land situate in Roy, 
Weber County, Utah. On the 29th day of May, 1950, 
Edwin F. Russell, as Lessor, entered into a written lease 
agreement with Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, as Lessee, by which he leased said land 
for a term of ten years, beginning on the 1st day of 
June, 1950 (Exhibit 1). 
Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., as Lessee, agreed to 
pay $100.00 a month, in advance, on the first day of 
each and every month, beginning the 1st of June, 1950, 
as rental therefor. 
The lease agreement contained a paragraph which 
is paragraph 8 thereof, as follows: 
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and per-
form all of the terms and conditions of this lease, 
on his part to be kept and performed, said Lessee 
shall have the right to renew this lease for a fur-
ther period, beginning as of the termination date 
of this lease, provided he shall notify the Lessor 
in writing thirty days prior to the terms of this 
agreement that he desires such renewal and pro-
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vided, further, that he shall sign or offer to sign 
a new lease upon the same terms and conditions 
as are herein contained." 
The defendant, Grant L. Valentine, is the assignee 
of the lease, through successive assignments of said 
lease, and has been in possession of the property de-
scribed in the lease from the 30th day of October, 1954 
(Exhibit 4). 
The defendant, Grant L. Valentine, attempted to 
renew the lease for a further period of ten years by giv-
ing the lessor written notice of his desire to renew such 
lease, thirty days prior to the expiration date of May 
31, 1960 (Exhibit 8). 
The plaintiff filed this action under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, asking the Court to interpret said lease 
and contending that the portion of Paragraph 8, which 
refers to renewal, is vague, ambiguous, indefinite and 
uncertain, and requesting the Court to enter judgment 
that the lease was only for a ten year period and termi~ 
nated on the 31st of May, 1960. (R. 2 and 3). 
The araft of the lease was prepared by Duane E. 
Fuller, Secretary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., and 
the final drawing of the same was made by Mr. C. N. 
Ottosen, who was the attorney for Self-Service Enter-
prises, Inc. ('T .5). Duane E. Fuller, the Secretary and 
Treasurer of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. and Helmut 
Moss, the President of the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. 
negotiated with the plaintiff, E~dwin F. Russell, for the 
lease ( T .5). The negotiations extended over a period of 
two or three weeks (T.6). The trial Julge found that 
the provisions of Paragraph 8 referring to renewal were 
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ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain and incapable of 
enforcement, and that any extension, or renewal, beyond 
~fay 31, 1960, would require negotiation and execution 
of a new lease agreement between the parties (R.22). 
The Court further found that the lease was for a period 
of ten years and terminated on May 31, 1960. (R.22). 
ST.ATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE T'RIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE, DE-
FENDANT'S EXHIBIT I, REFERRING TO RENEWAL 
THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDE1FINITE AND UN-
CERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMI'T'TING PAROL 
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE TERMS 
OF THE WRITTEN LEASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF 'THE LEASE, 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT I, REFERRING 'TO RENEWAL 
THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE AND UN-
CERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT. 
Respondent contends that the provision set forth 
in the lease concerning the right of the Appellant to re-
new the lease is ambiguous. The portion of the lease 
which required interpretation by the trial court is para-
graph 8, which provides as follows: 
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'' 8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and 
perform all of the terms and conditions of this 
lease, on his part to be kept and performed, said 
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease 
for a further period beginning as of the termina-
tion date of this lease, provided he shall notify 
the Lessor in writing thirty days prior to the 
terms of this agreement that he desires such 
renewal and provided, further, that he shall sign 
or offer to sign a new lease upon the same terms 
and conditions as are herein contained." 
In determining whether this paragraph is ambigu-
ous, the trial court was required to interpret the word-
ing contained therein in relation to the right of renewal. 
The language used is as follows: 
" ... said Lessee shall have the right to re-
new this lease for a further period beginning as 
of the termination date of this lease ... " 
The Respondent contends that this clause is ambiguous 
in that it does not set forth the particular period for 
which a renewal would he granted. The fact that the 
paragraph also contains a provision that the Lessee shall 
notify the Lessor, in writing, thirty days prior to the 
terms of the agreement that he desires a renewal, and 
that he is willing to sign a new lease upon the same 
terms and conditions, as therein contained, does not fix 
the period for which the renewal is to be. The Respondent 
contends that reference which is made to the same terms 
and conditions apply to all other terms and conditions 
of the lease, except the period of time of the original 
lease. If it were the intent of the parties to the agree-
ment to grant a renewal for the same period of time 
which was referred to in the original term, it could have 
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been simply stated in the paragraph providing for such 
renewal. The crux of this whole law suit rests upon the 
words "for a further period". 
If Paragraph 8 had provided that the Lessee shall 
have the right to renew this lease upon the same terms 
and conditions, and the words "for a further period" 
were not in the paragraph, this matter would not have 
been litigated as it would have been clear that the inten-
tion of the parties was to renew it for an additional ten 
year period. 
The court after hearing the evidence offered at the 
trial, concluded that this paragraph was ambiguous and 
made a finding to such fact as follows : 
''8. The court further finds that the provi-
sions in Paragraph 8 of the Lease referring to 
renewal thereof, are ambiguous, indefinite and 
uncertain, and incapable of enforcement, and that 
any extension, or renewal, beyond May 30, 1960, 
would require negotiation and execution of a new 
lease agreement by the parties." (R.22) 
Respondent asserts that such finding of the Court 
is amply supported in the law and by the evidence pre-
sented at the trial of this action. 
In the case of Realty Corp. vs. Park Cent.r.al Valet, 
297 NYS 40, it was held: 
"That a clause in a lease for a term l\farch 
1, 1933, to September 30, 1936, which provided for 
a renewal for 'an additional term of ______ years' 
was too indefinite and uncertain to constitute a 
renewal, on the ground that the parties apparent-
ly intended that where the clauses in the printed 
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form of the lease contained blanks, such clauses 
were to be disregarded. The Court said that liter-
ally there could be no renewal for a period of 
"years", it would eliminate seven months of the 
original term of three years and seven months.'' 
The Court held in Metcalf A~~to Co. vs. Norton, 119 
~Ie. 103, 109 Atl. 38'4, that the renewal clause of a lease 
gave the Lessee the privilege to re-lease at the end of 
the term for a term of years to be agreed upon at an 
agreed rental, and states: 
" ... that a contract to make or renew a lease 
is of no legal effect if the premises to be leased, 
or the term or rental, are to be determined by a 
subsequent agreement of the parties." 
In H award vs. Tomidch, 81 Miss. 703, 33 So. 493, 
the Court held: 
"That a provision 'with privilege of longer' 
in a lease of premises for one year, is too vague 
and uncertain to constitute a binding covenant for 
a renewal, as there is no certain meaning in regard 
to the term or the consideration for the renewal 
lease." 
The Court must determine the intention of the 
parties to a lease where an indefinite phrase is used, 
such as that which appears in the lease in the instant 
case. The general rule is set forth in 17 C.J.S. 689, and 
is stated as follows : 
''The primary rule of construction is that 
the Court must, if possible, ascertain and give 
effect to the mutual intention of the parties, as of 
the time the contract was made, so far as that 
may be done without contravention of legal prin-
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ciples, statutes, or public policy." 
17 C.J.S. at 695 continues: 
"As a general rule the language of a contract, 
in the case of ambiguity, should be interpreted 
in the sense that the promisor knew, or had rea~ 
son to know, that the promisee understood it .... 
A party to a contract generally will be held to 
that understanding which he knew was in accord-
ance with the understanding of the other party 
" . 
In the case of Assignment of Rich Hardware Co., 
196 P. 454,456; 22 Ariz. 254, the rule is stated as follows: 
"In other words, whatever is expected by one 
party to a contract and known to be so expected 
by the other, is to be deemed a part or condi-
tion of the contract." 
The certainty that is required not to have ambiguity 
in a contract is set forth in 32 Am. J ur. at page 806, as 
follows: 
"Like other contracts or agreements for a 
lease, the provision for a renewal must be certain 
in order to render it binding and enforceable. 
Indefiniteness, vagueness, and uncertainty in the 
terms of such provision will render it void unless 
the parties, by their subsequent conduct or acts 
supplement the covenant and thus remove an al-
leged uncertainty. The certainty that is required 
is such as will enable a Court to determine what 
has been agreed upon .... " 
A contract is construed strictly against the one draw-
ing it. The uncontradicted evidence before the Court is 
that the lease was drafted by the original Lessee, Self-
Service Enterprises, Inc., through Duane E. Fuller, the 
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Secretary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. Fuller was 
served with a subpoena in this action by the plaintiff. 
He testified that he had drafted the terms of this lease 
prior to the final drawing of the same by Mr. C. N. 
Ottosen, the Attorney for the Self-Service Enterprises, 
Inc. (Tr. 5). 
In the case of lJ!ifflin vs. Shikv, 77 Utah 190; 293 
P. page 1; it was held that a strict construction must 
be placed upon a contract against the one drawing it. 
Likewise in the following cases the same rule was stated: 
Smith vs. Burton, 4 Utah 2d 61; 286 P.2d 806 
Read vs. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 Utah 
529 ; 26 p 2d 325 
Penn Star Mining Co. vs. Lyman, 64 Utah 
343; 231 P. 107 
W ackerele vs. 111 artt1'bd(()le (Idaho) 353 P. 
2nd 782 
In the case of Hawat'ian Equipment Co. vs. Etmco 
Corp. 115 Utah 590 ; 207 P 2nd 794 at 800, this Court 
held: 
" ... where the language (of a contract) used 
is susceptible to more than one interpretation, 
it will be construed most strongly against the 
person using it." 
In the case of Contt"nental Bank & Trust Company 
vs. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P 2d 773, which is cited by 
the Appellant, Judge McDonough speaking for the Court 
said that Bybee was both the Attorney and the party in 
the action, who drafted the instrument and, therefore, 
that such instrument must be construed strictly against 
him. 
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The reason for the rule is expressed in 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts, Section 324, page 751, as follows: 
" ... a man is responsible for ambiguities in 
his own expressions and has no right to induce 
another to contract with him on the supposition 
that his words mean one thing, while he hopes the 
Court will adopt a construction by which they 
would mean another thing more to his advantage." 
The citation in 17 C.J.S. 751, further states: 
''To the extent that a contract is susceptible 
of two constructions by reason of doubt or un-
certainty as to the meaning of ambiguous lan-
guage, it is to be construed most strongly or 
strictly against the party by whom, or in whose 
behalf, the contract was prepared or the ambigu-
ous language was used, and liberally and most 
strongly in favor of the party who is not the 
author, and not responsible for the use, of the 
language giving rise to the doubt or uncertainty." 
The appellant argues that where there is uncer-
tainty in a lease relating to a renewal, that the tenant is 
favored and not the landlord and cites some law to sus-
tain this. However, it appears from the above authorities 
that this general rule has been tempered by the holdings 
of this Court, and Respondent contends that the rule 
that a contract is construed strictly against the one draw-
ing it, far out-weighs any favorable interpretation that 
might be made in behalf of the tenant under such cir-
cumstances. 
At page 7 of Appellant's Brief references is made 
to a general statement of the law concerning the word 
"renew'' as stated in 32 Am. J ur. Respondent has no 
10 
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quarrel with this statement. If, as hereinbefore stated, 
the Lessee was granted the right to renew the lease, Re-
spondent would concede that it would be upon the same 
terms and conditions there being no other qualifying 
words as used in the present lease such as ''for a fur-
ther period". 
Such ruling was made in the case cited by the Appel-
lant in Yom.an vs. Levine, 206 P. 2d 596, likewise the 
Respondent has no quarrel with the statement cited by 
the Appellant in C.J.S. Landlord and ·Tenant Section 
71, at Page 619. 
Respondent does dispute the statement, however, 
made by the Appellant that in the present case, the re-
newal paragraph contains a general covenant to renew. 
Appellant argues that Mr. Russell, the Lessor, knew 
the language of the lease and read it before: signing, and 
that if he were not satisfied with it: he was in a position 
to change or refuse to sign it. It must be remembered 
that Mr. Russell is not a lawyer; that he had negotiated 
with Fuller, who was experienced in drawing leases (Tr. 
11), concerning this lease; and he was relying upon what 
had been said by Fuller to him; and the discussions that 
they both had concerning the proposed lease prior to 
the signing of the same. 
In the case of Sta.rr vs. Holck, (Mich.) 28 N.W. 2d 
289, cited by the Appellant, it appears that the Court 
made its decision granting a renewal for a period of one 
year upon the theory that the lease should be construed 
favorably to the tenant. The rule of law that a strict con-
struction must be given to an instrument against one 
11 
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who drafted it was not raised in this case. 
In the case of Metcalf Auto Company vs. Norton, 
119 Me. 103, 109 Atl. 384, it appears to the Respondent 
that the Court went a long way in determining that the 
Lessee was entitled to have an extension of two years 
on the lease. The same is true of the case of Miller vs. 
Clemons, 276 S.W. 2nd 650, 651 (Ky.). 
In the case of Cuntmtngs vs. Rytting, 116 Utah 1, 
207 P. 2d 804, where the term of the lease is for five years 
with a five year option, Respondent agrees with the rul-
ing in this case and has no argument against it. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING PAROL 
T'ESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE TERMS 
OF THE WRITTEN LEASE. 
The trial court having determined that an ambiguity 
existed in the lease, it was then faced with the neces-
sity of determining the intention of the parties to the 
original lease because of such ambiguity as used in Para-
graph 8 of the lease. It was, therefore, necessary that 
parol evidence be received by the Court to ascertain, if 
possible, the intention of the parties. 
The rule for the acceptance of parol evidence of a 
written document is set forth in Penn St,ar Minimg Com-
pany vs. Lyman, et al., 64 Utah, 343; 231 P. 107 at 109 
and 110: 
".No doubt the rule is universal and inflex-
ible that extrinsic evidence may not be admitted, 
if its purpose or effect be to vary or to add to, 
or to 1nodify in any rna terial respect, the terms 
12 
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of a written instrument. Upon the other hand, 
the rule is just as extensive and as well estab-
lished that, in case the language of a written 
instrument is obscure, uncertain, or ambiguous, 
so that the intention of the parties is left in 
doubt by an inspection of the instrument alone, 
extrinsic evidence, within well-recognized limits, 
is always admissible to aid the court in arriving 
at the true intention of the parties. After all, 
it is the intention of the parties that constitutes 
their contract, and it is such intention that the 
courts aim to enforce. l\ioreover, unless the pro-
visions of a contract are clearly independent, 
distinct, and severable, all of the terms and pro-
visions must be considered and construed to-
gether, in order to arrive at the intention of the 
parties. In other words, the contract must be 
considered and construed as a whole, and such 
is the case, 'even if the separate parts are clear 
and free from ambiguity.' 2 Page, Contracts, 
Section 2038. 
The general rule applicable to contracts, the lan-
guage of which, is ambiguous or uncertain, is so clearly 
and comprehensively stated in Salt Lake City vs. Smith 
104 F. at page 462, 43 C.C.A. 642, that we take the liberty 
of reproducing the statement in full: 
" 'The purpose of a written contract is to 
evidence the terms on which the minds of the 
parties to it met when they made it, and the 
ascertainment of those terms, and the sense in 
which the parties to the agreement used them 
when they agreed to them is the great desider-
atum and the true end of all contractual inter-
pretation. The express terms of an agreement 
may not be abrogated, nullified, or modified by 
parol testimony; but, when their construction 
13 
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or extent is in question, the meaning of the terms 
upon which the minds of the parties met when 
they settled them, and their intention in using 
them, must be ascertained, they must prevail in 
the interpretation of the agreement, however 
broad or narrow the words in which they are ex-
pressed. In the discovery of this meaning, the 
intention, the situation of the parties, the facts 
and circumstances which surrounded and neces-
sarily influenced them when they made their 
contract, the reasonableness of the respective 
claims under it, and, above all, the subject-matter 
of the agreement and the purpose of its execu-
tion, are always conducive to, and often as essen-
tial and controlling in, the true interpretation of 
the contract as the mere words of its various 
stipulations. These are rules for the construction 
of contracts which commend themselves to 
reason and are established by repeated decisions 
of the courts, and they must not be permitted to 
escape attention in the consideration of the con-
tract which this case presents. Accumulator Co. 
vs. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 64 F. 70, 74, 12 C.C.A. 
37, 41, 42, 27 U. S. App. 364, 372.'" 
In the case of Salt Lake City vs. Smith, 104 Fed. Page 
462, which was referred to in the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Pe:nn Star Mt"ntng Co. vs. Ly'l'tUJJn, 
it was held: 
''The fundamental inquiry in construing all 
contracts is a discovery of the intention of the 
parties. When this cannot he done with certainty 
from the terms of the instrument - that is in 
case the meaning of the terms is doubtful, de-
batable, or ambiguous - the true intention must 
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be ascertained bv reference to the facts and cir-
cumstances prec~ding and accompanying the exe-
cution of the instrument. 
"The purpose to be subserved by this rule 
is to place the court, or the jury, in the position 
of the parties at the time the contract was made, 
so that the language used may be interpreted in-
telligently. 
Hence, proof of facts which tend to illustrate 
or explain the language used in the contract and 
to place the court or jury as nearly as may be 
in the situation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting, is always admissible when the meaning 
of the terms used is debatable." 
This decision is supported by citations in 33 ALR 
2d 979,980. The rationale of these decisions is spelled 
out in 33 ALR 2d, at page 983, as follows : 
"The reason for admitting parol evidence for 
the purpose of explaining ambiguities is very o b-
vious. There is a great deal of difference between 
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain 
that which is written. In the former case, the 
attempt is to clarify without denying. Parties, 
through inadvertence or lack of trial or skill, or 
merely by reason of the frailties of language, may 
express their intention vaguely. In such instances 
it would be a harsh rule were the court to adopt 
and enforce that particular one of several pos-
sible interpretations which to the judicial mind, 
and with entire disregard for the situation of the 
parties, was indicated by the language chosen. 
Of course, where a party seeks to deny the plain 
import of a writing which reveals no uncertainty 
in meaning, even when viewed in connection with 
the circumstances of its making, the rule of sub-
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stantive law by which prior extrinsic matters are 
merged in the writing prevents him from suc-
ceeding. But where he seeks merely to explain 
that which is imperfectly expressed, the rule of 
merger is not violated." 
Further support to the rule that parole evidence 
was necessary in this action is found in 48 ALR 2d at 
1268, and is expressed in these words : 
"Whenever the terms of a contract are sus-
ceptible of more than one interpretation, or an 
ambiguity arises, or the extent and object of the 
contract cannot be ascertained from the language 
employed, parol evidence may he introduced to 
show what was in the minds of the parties at the 
time of making the contract and to determine the 
object on which it was designed to operate." 
Likewise this rule is stated in 20 Am. J ur. at 999-
1000 as follows: 
"Whenever the terms of a contract are sus-
ceptible of more than one interpretation, or an 
ambiguity arises, or the extent and object of 
the contract cannot be ascertained from the lan-
guage employed, parol evidence may be intro-
duced to show what was in the minds of the parties 
at the time of making the contract and to deter-
mine the object on which it was designed to oper-
ate. Testimony to explain ambiguous language 
in a contract may not be excluded on the ground 
that it is an effort to vary the terms of a written 
contract by parol testimony. The ambiguity may 
arise from words plain in themselves, hut uncer-
tain when applied to the subject matter of the 
contract, or from words which are uncertain in 
their literal sense." 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is also stated therein as follows: 
''Testimony to explain ambiguous language 
in a contract may not be excluded on the ground 
that it is an effort to vary the terms of a contract 
by parol testimony." 
The same ruling is held in Brown vs. Markland, 16 Utah 
360; Great Western Printt"ng Company vs. Belcher, 104 
s.w. 894. 
From the rule laid down in these authorities, which 
unquestionably is the law, it was proper for the court 
to admit testimony of Duane E. Fuller, the Secretary-
Treasurer of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc. and of Edwin 
F. Russell, the Respondent herein, to show what was in 
the minds of the parties at the time of the making 
of the lease, and to determine the object on which it was 
designed to operate. It will be recalled that Mr. Fuller 
testified that he carried on negotiations with the plain-
tiff in this action for a period of approximately two or 
three weeks prior to the final execution of the lease. 
('Tr. 6) In these negotiations Fuller tried to get Russell 
to grant an option for the renewal of the lease for a full 
ten year, or for a lesser term, but that the plaintiff re-
fused to grant a renewal or extension of the lease for 
a period of longer than the initial ten year period. (T;r. 
10-11) 
In Fuller's interpretation of the wording of the 
paragraph concerning of the granting of a further period 
of time, he stated that he had rough-drafted other leases 
for the corporation; that if it were intended that there 
should be a definite renewal period stated in the lease 
for five or ten years, he would have written it into the 
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" ... Q. Now, had you asked Mr. Russell for 
an additional ten-year period of time~ 
''A. Yes, we asked him a couple or three times 
for a ten-year option. 
"Q. What was his response~ 
"A. Well, he didn't want to give it. 
"Q. vVell did he say he didn't want to give it. 
" ... A. Well, he objected. I remember he 
said, 'you can't - You don't know what will hap-
pen in ten years.' I remember something like that. 
I can't remember anything else." 
It appears that C. N. Ottosen, the attorney for the 
original Lessee was never present during any of the nego-
tiations, such negotiations being carried on by Duane E. 
Fuller, Secretary-Treasurer of the Company, and Helmut 
Moss, the President, with Russell. It is a fair conclusion, 
therefore, that whatever was put in the lease concerning 
a renewal thereof, was because of the rough-draft 
made by Fuller, or upon instructions from Fuller. 
Edwin F. Russell, the Respondent in this action, in 
negotiating with Moss and Fuller, when the matter was 
discussed about the period of the lease, testified in the 
following words: 
"It wi11 be a ten-year lease or we cant' make a 
deal." (Tr. 25), 
and further in the testimony he stated as follows: 
"And finally we made the agreement on the 
ten-year lease. And we discussed about what might 
happen at the end of the ten-year lease. If I was 
willing - maybe I wouldn't be willing - maybe 
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I wouldn't want to re-lease. If I did, then we would 
write up a new lease for the period that we de-
cided on." (Tr. 25) 
Russell had nothing to do with the writing of the 
Lease (Tr. 26). 
From this testimony it becomes evident that the 
original parties to this lease had no intention that a 
second period of ten years was contemplated by the 
Lessee as drawn. 
The assignment of the original lease introduced as 
defendant's Exhibit 6, between the Self-Service Enter-
prises, Inc. as the Assignor to Wilburn C. West, as As-
signee of the original lease, shows that the original par-
ties understood that the lease was only for a ten year 
term. The wording of this assignment is as follows: 
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto Wilburn 
C. West and his assigns from the 13th day of 
January, 1951, for and during all the rest and re-
m.ainder yet to come of and tn the term of ten 
years menti·oned in said lease . .. " (italics are 
Respondent's) 
It will be noted that thereafter the subsequent assign-
ments did not have this qualification in them. The 
original Assignee and subsequent assignees, cannot obtain 
more under the assignments than that which was origin-
ally stated in the first assignment. 
Almost without exception, the cases cited by the Ap-
pellant that parol evidence cannot be introduced to vary 
the terms of written instruments, are based on cases in 
which the trial courts found there was no ambiguity in 
the documents asked to be construed. 
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An example of this is the most recent case cited by 
the Appellant P,ulsipher vs. Tolboe, 373 P.2d 360: (Utah 
decided April :2, 1962) 
''. . . Inasmuch as the language is clear and 
unan1biguous, there is no basis for 'interpreting 
it' by shmving what the intent or 'understanding' 
of the defendant was by extraneous evidence." 
r_rhis quotation is admitted in Appellant's Brief at page 
17. 
In Ephr,aim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P. 2d 221, cited by Appellant, the trial court 
also found that: 
"The parties here spelled out just how the 
proceeds from the operation of a theater should 
be applied ... The understanding thus expressed 
is plain ... " 
In the case of Jensen's Used Cars v. Rvce, 7 Utah 2d 
276, 323 P. 2d 259 cited by the Appellant, the trial court 
found that the defendant had signed a conditional sales 
contract that contained clear, complete terms, including 
the price, and the defendant admitted all of this, so that 
there was no ambiguity. 
In the case of llfathias v. JJiadsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 
P. 2d 952, the Court held that while the instrument was 
very poorly drawn, that the intent of the parties could 
be determined in what was expressed in the instrument. 
In the case of Continental Bank and Trust Company 
v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773, the law pertaining 
to introduction of parol testimony is stated and is not in 
conflict ·with what the Respondent contends in this case. 
The question before the Court was whether the parties 
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intended by the Agreement that the Respondent should 
assume the obligation on a note held by the Continental 
Bank and Trust Company, and the Court held that the 
intent should be ascertained first from the four corners 
of the instrument itself, second from other contempor-
aneous writing concerning the same subject matter, and 
third from the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions. 
Wilson v. Ga.rdner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931, 
there was a written contract entered into between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the plaintiff was to 
feed the defendant's cattle. Orally the parties made other 
agreements. The question in this case was whether the 
parties may orally modify an agreement in writing not 
within the Statute of Frauds. It appears to the Respond-
ent that this case is not in point with the instant case. 
In the case of Oliver v. Nugen, 308 P. 2d 132 (Kan.) 
it was held that an action upon a written contract tried 
in the lower court by both parties upon the theory that the 
contract is ambiguous, the appellants cannot change their 
theory on appeal and proceed on the premise that the 
written contract is free from ambiguity, and thereby 
preclude the admission of oral testimony to determine 
its meaning. The Court held that it is a judicial function 
to interpret a written contract which is free from ambig-
uity and does not require oral testimony to determine its 
meaning. 
In the case of Washingto1't Fish and Oyst.er Company 
v. G. B. Halferty a1'td Company, 269 P. 2d 806, the action 
involved the interpretation of a contract for the outright 
sale of canned salmon. The court held that the rule is 
universal that the written contract itself must be re-
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sorted to as the source of authority for receiving parol 
evidence. Respondent has no quarrel with this decision. 
It is not often in a law suit that you have testimony 
concerning the construction of a contract in which both 
parties to the original agreement concur, at least in prin-
ciple, as to its interpretation. 
This evidence should carry great weight in arriving 
at a decision in this case. The Respondent contends the 
Appellant, as successor in interest of the original Lessee, 
is bound by the testimony and interpretation of such 
original Lessee which was his predecessor in interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, therefore, contends that the judgment 
of the trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL C. POWELL and 
D. JAY WILSON 
614 David Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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